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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGou h*
and Elinor H. HittT
This Article addresses significant case law and statutory changes'
that arose during the survey period.2 Legislation passed by the Georgia
General Assembly in 2011 regarding the appellate procedure and in 2012
regarding grandparent visitation rights took effect, and the Georgia
Supreme Court continued to accept nonfrivolous appeals in divorce cases,
providing guidance regarding domestic relations law.
I.

CHILD CUSTODY, JURISDICTION

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered questions of jurisdiction
between courts and jurisdiction between states. In Dunbar v. Ertter,3
the Juvenile Court of Coweta County found A.J., a minor child whose
parents were deceased, to be deprived, and in an order dated October 19,
2008, gave Dunbar, the child's maternal grandmother, long-term custody
4
(subject to periodic review) of A.J. until the child's eighteenth birthday.
On June 17, 2010, the Superior Court of Cobb County entered an order
granting the Errters, A.J.'s maternal aunt and uncle, permanent custody
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University of California at Berkley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966).
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** Associate in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough & McGinnis, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); University of Georgia (M.S.W., 1996); Georgia State
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1. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations,Annual Survey of Georgia Law,

63 MERCER L. REV. 137 (2011).
2. This Article focuses on developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2011 to May 31, 2012, though it includes a small number of cases decided in April and
May 2011.
3. 312 Ga. App. 440, 718 S.E.2d 350 (2011).
4. Id. at 440, 718 S.E.2d at 351; see also O.C.G.A. § 15-11-58(i) (2012).
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of the child based on the best interests of the minor child. Dunbar
appealed the superior court's order.5
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's grant of
permanent custody of A.J. to the child's aunt and uncle when the prior
order granting long-term custody that was issued by the juvenile court,
which had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, was unchallenged and
still in effect.6
In Delgado v. Combs,' the court of appeals held that, pursuant to the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
the Georgia trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a
Kansas custody decree and grant the father's motion for sole physical
custody.9 The father failed to meet his burden of proof and show either
that Kansas had been divested of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
subject matter or that the Kansas court had made a determination that
Georgia provided a more convenient forum, and that there was no
evidence to support a finding that none of the parties resided in Kansas
when, in fact, the mother continued to reside in Kansas.10
II. CHILD CUSTODY, MODIFICATION
In Avren v. Garten," the trial court was upheld in its dismissal of the
mother's action to modify custody and to hold the father in contempt
while she, the legal guardian, was withholding the father's visitation
rights.12 A legal guardian is prohibited "from bringing an action for
modification of child custody or visitation rights or any application for
contempt of court so long as visitation rights are withheld by the legal
guardian in violation of the custody order.""
In Gallo v. Kofler,'4 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld and found no
error on the trial court's part in modifying custody and awarding the
father custody of the parties' minor child based on the mother's planned
move to New York. 5 In determining it was in the child's best interest
to change primary custody to the father, the court considered the
following: (1) in violation of the standing order which provided that
5. Dunbar, 312 Ga. App. at 440-41, 718 S.E.2d at 351.
6. Id. at 441-42, 718 S.E.2d at 351-52.

7. 314 Ga. App. 419, 724 S.E.2d 436 (2012).
8. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -104 (2010).
9. Delgado, 314 Ga. App. at 425, 724 S.E.2d at 441.

10. Id. at 426-28, 724 S.E.2d at 441-43.
11. 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011).

12. Id. at 187, 710 S.E.2d at 134.
13. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-9-24(b) (2010).
14. 289 Ga. 355, 711 S.E.2d 687 (2011).
15. Id. at 355, 711 S.E.2d at 688.
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neither party take the child from the State of Georgia during the
pendency of the litigation, the mother took the child to New York for
visits and moved some of the child's belongings to New York; (2) the
child had been thriving in Georgia; (3) when comparing the child's living
arrangements in Georgia and in New York, the child had better quality
of life in Georgia; (4) the child's relationship with the father would be
harmed by moving to New York; and (5) the mother showed a lack of
financial stability.1"
III.

CHILD CUSTODY, GRANDPARENT'S RIGHTS

During the survey period, both appellate courts and the state
legislature dealt with grandparents' right to seek custody of or visitation
with their grandchildren. In Scott v. Scott, 17 the paternal grandparents
sought custody of their two granddaughters, asserting that on March 4,
2008, the children's father was murdered by the mother, and that the
mother was set to be tried for the murder on the same date the
grandparents filed their petition.'" The grandparents asserted standing
to seek custody pursuant to sections 19-7-1(b.1) 19 and 19-9-220 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 21
The trial court granted the mother's motion to dismiss the grandparents' petition, concluding that additional facts should have been
alleged and were required to survive the motion to dismiss.22 The
Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the grandparents'
petition gave fair notice that.they sought custody under O.C.G.A. §§ 197-1(b.1) and 19-9-2 based on the mother's alleged murder of the
father.' The court observed, "[Miurder of one parent by another can
be considered as evidence of parental unfitness," so these allegations
were enough to survive a motion to dismiss.'
The mother also argued that because another court denied the
grandparents' request for visitation two years prior, their current
petition for custody was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
which "precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been
litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the

16. Id. at 356-57, 711 S.E.2d at 689.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809 (2011).
Id. at 726-27, 716 S.E.2d at 810.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) (2010).
O.C.GA. § 19-9-2 (2010).
Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 727, 716 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 728-29, 716 S.E.2d at 811.

23. Id. at 729, 716 S.E.2d at 811.
24. Id. (citing In re J.L.M., 204 Ga. App. 46, 47, 418 S.E.2d 415, 417-18 (1992)).

124

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

same parties or their privies,"25 and by res judicata pursuant to the
UCCJEA, 26 which states,

A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had
jurisdiction under this article binds all persons... who have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as
to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.27
In the prior visitation action, the grandparents were required to show
that the children would be harmed unless visitation was granted and
that the interests of the children would be best served by such visitation.2 However, in the court of appeals decision, a third-party custody
action, the grandparents were required to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the children would suffer physical or emotional harm if
custody were awarded to the mother, and that an award of custody to
the paternal grandparents was in the children's best interests by
promoting the children's welfare and happiness.29
"[D]ifferent issues were actually and necessarily decided in the
visitation action" than were to be decided in the court of appeals custody
case; therefore, collateral estoppel did not prevent the grandparents from
seeking custody of their grandchildren after they failed to have visitation
rights established.3 0 Similarly, res judicata did not bar the grandparents' current custody action because O.C.G.A. § 19-9-45 only applies
to issues actually decided in a prior action.3 ' The prior order related
to the grandparents' right to visitation, not custody, which was at issue
in this action. 2
The case of Kunz v. Bailey,3 reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court
in January 2012, was originally decided by the court of appeals in
2011. 34 The biological parents of the child at issue divorced in June

2002, and the mother soon remarried. In 2006, the biological father

25. Id. at 730, 716 S.E.2d at 812 (quoting Matherly v. Kinney, 227 Ga. App. 302, 304,
489 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1997)).
26. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 to -104 (2010).
27. Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 731, 716 S.E.2d at 813; see also O.CG.A. § 19-9-45.
28. Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 730-31, 716 S.E.2d at 812; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)
(2012).
29. Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 731, 716 S.E.2d at 812 (citing Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587,
599, 544 S.E.2d 99, 108 (2001)); see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1).
30. Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 731, 716 S.E.2d at 812-13.
31. Id. at 731-32, 716 S.E.2d at 813; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-9-45.
32. Scott, 311 Ga. App. at 732, 716 S.E.2d at 813.
33. 290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).
34. Bailey v. Kunz, 307 Ga. App. 710, 706 S.E.2d 98 (2011).

2012]
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surrendered his parental rights, and the stepfather adopted the child.
Following a dispute abodt an ongoing grandparent visitation, the
biological paternal grandparents filed a petition for visitation pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3."5 The mother and adoptive father fied a motion
to dismiss; thereafter they appealed the court's denial of the motion.36
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), a grandparent does not have the
right to file an original action for visitation rights where the parents of
the child are not separated and the child is living with both parents.3"
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals, finding error
in not treating the stepfather as a parent for the purposes of the
statute.3' Although the word "parent" is undefined in O.C.G.A. § 19-73, the adoption code defines the word "parent" to include "legal father"
of a child 39 and defines "legal father" as "amale who ... [h]as legally
adopted a child."'
Once the biological father surrendered his parental rights, the child
became a legal stranger to the biological father's family.41 The adoptive
father became the parent within the meaning of the statute, not the
biological father, and thus the biological paternal grandparents had no
standing to seek visitation under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.42
In Hudgins v. Harding,43 a case decided in January 2012, the
biological paternal grandmother's request for visitation with her
youngest grandchild, K.H., was at issue. Barbara Harding and
Christopher McCurry were the natural parents of three children. In
May 2000, Barbara Harding married Wesley Harding. In 2003,
McCurry's parental rights were terminated, and Mr. Harding adopted
the three children. Hudgins subsequently filed a petition for visitation
rights with the children pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. The trial court
determined that Hudgins was not entitled to seek visitation rights in
light of Mr. Harding's adoption of KIH."
The adoption of a minor child generally extinguishes any visitation
rights of the child's former grandparents;45 however, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

O.C.GA. § 19-7-3 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
Kunz, 307 Ga. App. at 711, 706 S.E.2d at 99.
Kunz, 290 Ga. at 362, 720 S.E.2d at 635; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b).
Kunz, 290 Ga. at 362, 720 S.E.2d at 635.
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(8) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6XA); Kunz, 290 Ga. at 362, 720 S.E.2d at 635.
Kunz, 290 Ga. at 363, 720 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 363, 720 S.E.2d at 635-36.
313 Ga. App. 613, 722 S.E.2d 355 (2012).
Id. at 613-14, 722 S.E.2d at 356.
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(aX1) (2010).
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3(b) sets forth a limited exception." A grandparent of a minor child
may seek visitation rights "whenever there has been an adoption in
which the adopted child has been adopted by the child's blood relative
or by a stepparent, notwithstanding the provisions of [O.C.G.A. §1 19-819. ' ,

7

However, an original action is not authorized "where the parents

of the minor child are not separated and the child is living with both
parents."48
Relying on an obsolete version of the statute, the trial court concluded
that Hudgins was not entitled to visitation rights with the child, because
the child had been adopted by a stepparent who was not a blood relative
of the child.4 It was improper for the trial court to deny Hudgins's
petition based on an outdated version of the statute; however, a
grandparent's original action for visitation rights is not authorized
"where the parents of the minor child are not separated and the child is
living with both parents."5 ° The term "parents" includes both biological
and adoptive parents.5
K.H. was adopted by her stepfather, Mr. Harding, but "[tihis fact alone
... did not automatically preclude Hudgins from seeking visitation
rights with KH .... and the trial court erred by dismissing Hudgins's
petition on such ground."" To determine whether Hudgins's petition
was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b), the trial court was required
to, but did not, make findings of fact concerning whether Barbara and
Wesley Harding were separated and whether KH. was living with them
both.53 The record included contradictory evidence on this issue; thus,
the case was remanded "for the trial court to reconsider Hudgins's
petition for visitation rights ... in light of the appropriate factual
findings and the correct legal analysis." 4
Effective May 1, 2012, the Georgia legislature significantly changed
grandparents' rights to seek visitation with their grandchildren pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. 5' Historically, where a grandparent files an
original action or intervenes inan existing action regarding custody of

46. Hudgins, 313 Ga. App. at 614, 722 S.E.2d at 356 (alteration in original); see also
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b).
47. Hudgins, 313 Ga. App. at 614, 722 S.E.2d at 356; see also O.C.GA § 19-7-3(b)(1).
48. O.C.GA. § 19-7-3(bX2).
49. Hudgins, 313 Ga. App. at 615, 722 S.E.2d at 356-57.

50.
51.
S.E.2d
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 615, 722 S.E.2d at 357; see also O.C.GA § 19-7-3(b)(2).
Hudgins, 313 Ga. App. at 615, 722 S.E.2d at 357 (citing Kunz, 290 Ga. at 362, 720
at 635); see also O.C.GA. § 19-7-3(b).
Hudgins, 313 Ga. App. at 615-16, 722 S.E.2d at 357 (citation omitted).
Id. at 616, 722 S.E.2d at 357.
Id.
O.C.GA § 19-7-3; Ga. H.R. Bill 1198, Reg. Sess. (2012).
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the child, the grandparent may be awarded reasonable visitation rights
if the court finds the health or welfare of the child would be harmed
unless visitation is granted and the best interests of the child would be
served by such visitation. 6 In considering whether the health or
welfare of the child would be harmed without the visitation requested by
a grandparent, the amended statute now provides:

mhe court shall consider and may find that harm to the child is
reasonably likely to result where, prior to the original action or
intervention: (A) The minor child resided with the grandparent for six
months or more; (B) The grandparent provided financial support for
the basic needs of the child for at least one year; (C) There was an
established pattern of regular visitation or child care by the grandparent with the child; or (D) Any other circumstance exists indicating that
emotional or physical harm would be reasonably likely to result if such
visitation is not granted."7
Language that previously indicated no presumption in favor of
visitation by any grandparent was removed, 58 and a rebuttable
presumption was created that a child who has minimal or no opportunity
for contact with a grandparent may suffer emotional injury that is
harmful to the child's health.59 Further, when the failure to provide
contact with grandparents would result in emotional harm to the child,
the parent's decision regarding such visitation will be given deference
but is not conclusive.6' In effect, the burden of proof has now shifted
from the grandparent seeking visitation to the parent seeking to deny
the visitation request.6 '
Further, notwithstanding the above language, "if one of the parents of
a minor child dies, is incapacitated, or is incarcerated, the court may
award the parent of the deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated parent
of such minor child reasonable visitation" with the child, if the court
finds "such visitation would be in the best interests of the child." 2
Again, the custodial parent's judgment regarding their child's best
interest is given deference, but is not conclusive.63

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-3(bXl), -3(c)(1).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(cX1).
Ga. H.R. Bill 1198 § 1.
O.C.GA. § 19-7-3(cX3).
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d).
Id.
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Where grandparent visitation is awarded, such time shall not be less
than twenty-four hours in any one-month period.6 Moreover, even if
visitation is not awarded to a grandparent, the court can order the
parent to notify the grandparent of every performance of the minor child,
which is open to the public.6 5
IV. CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION
The case of Bagwell v. Bagwell66 looked at the two-year limitation on
child support modification actions found in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(2).67
In May 2010, the father filed a petition to modify his child support
obligation downward, claiming a substantial decrease in income and
financial status since the divorce was final in 2006. After the father, an
the trial court dismissed his
attorney, failed to respond to discovery,
6
modification action as a sanction. 8
Fourteen days after the trial court announced its intention to dismiss
the modification petition, the father fied a second petition to modify his
child support obligation downward, again claiming a substantial
decrease in income and financial status since the divorce was final in
2006. The mother moved to dismiss the second modification action on
the basis that it was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(2). 69 The
trial court allowed the modification action to proceed, stating, in part,
that its dismissal of the father's first modification action "was not an
adjudication on the merits, but simply a sanction."7 °
The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court.7 '
Unless specified otherwise in the trial court's order of dismissal, the
dismissal of the first modification action as a sanction for the father's
failure to comply with discovery was an adjudication on the merits.7 2
There was no such limiting language in the trial court's dismissal; thus,
it was a final order.73 The Georgia Supreme Court noted, "Once an
order of dismissal is entered[,] it may not be modified by the trial court
outside the term of court in which it was issued in order to specify that
it was without prejudice."74

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(cX4).
O.C.GA. § 19-7-3(g).
290 Ga. 378, 721 S.E.2d 847 (2012).
Id. at 379,721 S.E.2d at 849; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(kX2) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
Bagwell, 290 Ga. at 378-79, 721 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 379, 721 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 380, 721 S.E.2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
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Apart from three specific statutory exceptions, "[nlo petition to modify
child support may be filed by either parent within a period of two years
from the date of the final order on a previous petition to modify by the
same parent ....
As this was a final order, the two-year rule was
triggered.76
The father insisted that since his modification was based on an
involuntary loss of income as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(j)(1), 7 he
should have been able to proceed despite the two-year rule.78 However,
this exception was not invoked in the father's petition, and even if it had
been, the relevant time frame for such alleged loss of income was from
the date of the prior modification ruling (fourteen days before the second
action was fied), not the original divorce decree. 9
."5

V. ALIMONY
In Hammond v. Hammond,8 the husband's pension was the only
significant marital asset to be divided in the parties' divorce case.8 '
Pursuant to statute, this pension could not be attached, subjected to
process, or assigned. 2 At trial, the wife urged the court to adopt the
time-rule formula, which can be used to determine the equitable
distribution of a pension plan "by dividing the number of marital years
that the employee spouse earned toward the pension by the number of
years of total service toward the pension." 3 In lieu of adopting the
time-rule formula, "the trial court ordered husband to pay wife alimony
in the amount of $1,250 per month, starting the first month husband
receives his monthly pension benefit."'
The wife appealed, arguing that this determination was erroneous as
it did not bear any relation to the correct valuation of the pension. 5
Nevertheless, the record demonstrated that "it was at [the] wife's urging
that the trial court chose to evaluate and 'distribute' the pension.., as
alimony[,and that a] trial court is 'given a wide latitude in fixing the

75.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(2).

76. Bagwell, 290 Ga. at 381, 721 S.E.2d at 850.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(Colo.
84.
85.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(j)(1) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
Bagwell, 290 Ga. at 381, 721 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 379-81, 721 S.E.2d at 849-51.
290 Ga. 518, 722 S.E.2d 729 (2012).
Id. at 518, 722 S.E.2d at 730.
O.C.G.A § 47-3-28(a) (2010); Hammond, 290 Ga. at 518, 722 S.E.2d at 730.
Hammond, 290 Ga. at 519, 722 S.E.2d at 731 (cithigln re Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 531
1995)).
Id. at 518, 722 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 519, 722 S.E.2d at 731.
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amount of alimony."'8 The court further stated that "a party will not
be heard to complain of error induced by their own conduct, nor of error
expressly invited during the course of trial.""'
VI.

CLASSIFICATION OF ASSETS AND EQUITABLE DIVSION

In Highsmith v. Highsmith,' the trial court's judgment was partially
reversed.8 9 Where the wife brought the investment account into the
marriage, no marital funds were placed in the account during the
marriage, and the account value only rose or fell with the market, it was
error for the trial court to find that the approximately $74,000 left in the
account at the end of the marriage was marital property subject to
equitable division.'
In the same case, the trial court was upheld in its application, and
lack of application, of the source-of-funds rule, which "is a method of
equitable distribution of marital property."9' Under this rule, the "trial
court 'must determine the contribution of the spouse who brought the
[property] to the marriage, and weigh it against the total non-marital
and marital investment in the property.'9 2 On appeal, the wife
maintained that the trial court erred in applying the source-of-funds rule
to the husband's office property but not to her investment account
funds.93
After the parties married, the wife withdrew $210,000 from her premarital investment account and placed it in a joint account held by the
parties to invest in rental properties. The trial court found that the
source-of-funds rule could not be applied as there was simply not enough
evidence presented regarding the joint account at the time of deposit or
how much of the $210,000 was spent versus marital funds spent on the
purchase of real estate for the parties' rental business. At the same
time, the trial court did take into consideration this "proposed credit" of
up to $210,000 in awarding the wife significantly more of the marital
estate than was awarded to husband.94 In light of recent case law
regarding transmutation of separate assets into marital assets, it is

86. Id. (quoting Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552, 615 S.E.2d 510, 511 (2005)).
87. Id.
88. 289 Ga. 841, 716 S.E.2d 146 (2011).
89. Id. at 844, 716 S.E.2d at 150.

90. Id. at 842-43, 716 S.E.2d at 148-49.
91. Id. at 843, 716 S.E.2d at 149.
92. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Windham v. Araya, 286 Ga. 501, 502,690 S.E.2d

168, 169 (2010)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 841-43, 716 S.E.2d at 148-49.
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interesting that the Georgia Supreme Court did not hold that the
character of the $210,000 was changed from the wife's separate asset to
a marital asset via a gift to the marital estate evidenced by the wife's
deposit of these monies into a jointly held account.95
The source-of-funds rule was applied to real estate held by the
husband.9 6 Evidence showed that soon after the parties married, the
husband used $70,000 to purchase and renovate an office.97 Approximately $20,000 of the renovations were from the the husband's
premarital funds, and the remaining $50,000 used to purchase the
property and complete the renovations were marital funds.98 The trial
court's decision was upheld in finding that twenty-nine percent of the
equity in the building was the husband's separate property, with the
remaining seventy-one percent being classified as marital property
subject to equitable division.99 From the text of the opinion it is
unclear how this real estate was titled, though given that the property
was purchased during the marriage with marital funds, is the treatment
of the husband's $20,000 renovation investment as his separate property
consistent with recent case law?'
In Shaw v. Shaw, 1°1 the lower court's decision was upheld in finding
that assets inherited during the marriage were subject to equitable
distribution of property."°2 During the marriage, the husband inherited monies and land in Florida from his mother. Upon receipt of the
monies, the husband established two investment accounts in the names
of the husband and wife jointly, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. When the husband inherited the Florida property, he directed that
the land be deeded to the wife and him as tenants in common, giving
each an undivided one-half interest in the property 0 3 These acts on
the husband's part evidenced his intent to transform his separate
property into marital property.104

95. Id. at 842, 716 S.E.2d at 148. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 277-78, 280,
705 S.E.2d 839,843-45 (2010); Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 282 Ga. 108, 110,646 S.E.2d 207,
211 (2007).
96. Highsmith, 289 Ga. at 843, 716 S.E.2d at 149.
97. Id. at 843 n.1, 716 S.E.2d at 149 n.1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. But see Miller, 288 Ga. at 280, 705 S.E.2d at 845; Coe v. Coe, 285 Ga. 863,
864-65, 684 S.E.2d 598, 600-01 (2009).
101. 290 Ga. 354, 720 S.E.2d 614 (2012).
102. Id. at 357, 720 S.E.2d at 617.
103. Id. at 355, 720 S.E.2d at 615-16.
104. Id. at 355, 720 S.E.2d at 616.
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PROCEDURE

A procedural issue arose in Gresham-Green v. Mainones.1°5 The wife
argued on appeal "that the trial court erred in relying on the report of
a guardian ad litem that had not been admitted into evidence."" 6 The
Georgia Supreme Court held that no error existed where the guardian
ad litem actually testified at the final hearing, and the wife could not
show that the trial court improperly relied on the guardian ad litem's
report in any way. 10
VIII.

APPEAL

The supersedeas effect on the trial court's authority to act was at issue
in Avren v. Garten. °8 On appeal, the mother complained that the trial
court erred when it entered an attorney fee award in favor of the father
after she filed her notice of appeal and application for discretionary
review. 1°9 The Georgia Supreme Court noted that "[tihe filing of an
application for appeal shall act as a supersedeas to the extent that a
notice of appeal acts as a supersedeas." 0
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that supersedeas upon appeal does
not preclude the trial judge from entering an attorney fees award arising
out of an appealed case, explaining that
the supersedeas that results from the filing of an application to appeal
or a notice of appeal deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to take
action in the case that would affect the judgment on appeal, but it does
not deprive the trial court of entering an order that might be affected
by the outcome of the appeal of the underlying judgment, "subject to
the peril that any decision reached which conflicts with the decision of
the appellate court when rendered will thereby be made nugatory."
Effective July 1, 2011, O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34"2 and 5-6-3511 were
amended to provide that "[wihere an appeal is taken pursuant to
[O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-351 for a judgment or order granting
nonmonetary relief in a child custody case, such judgment or order shall
105. 290 Ga. 721, 725 S.E.2d 277 (2012).

106. Id. at 722, 725 S.E.2d at 278.
107. Id.
108. 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011).
109. Id. at 189-90, 710 S.E.2d at 136.
110. Id. at 190, 710 S.E.2d at 136; see also O.C.GA. § 5-6-35(h) (1995 & Supp. 2012).
111. Avren, 289 Ga. at 190-91, 710 S.E.2d at 136 (quoting Se. Wholesale Furniture Co.
v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 84 Ga. App. 271, 276, 66 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1951)).
112. O.C.GA § 5-6-34 (1995 & Supp. 2012).
113. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995 & Supp. 2012).
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stand until reversed or modified by the reviewing court unless the trial
court states otherwise in its judgment or order."" 4 Thus, the filing of
an application for appeal or notice of appeal shall not act as supersedeas
to prevent the trial court's custody ruling from going into effect, unless
the trial court provides otherwise." 5
Appellate procedure was the subject of appeal in Brabant v. Patton. 116 Patton filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a petition
for citation of contempt, which Brabant moved to have dismissed. The
trial court's ruling, issued on September 23, 2010, resulted in an interim
custody order. Brabant timely appealed this order."7 On Patton's
motion, the trial court dismissed Brabant's appeal "on the ground that
all appeals in domestic relations cases are discretionary pursuant to
[O.C.G.A.] § 5-6-35," and "that because the order was interlocutory,
Brabant was required to obtain a Certificate of Immediate
Review before
8
5-6-34(b)."1
§
O.C.G.A.
to
pursuant
appeal"
an
filed
she
The court of appeals held that Brabant had a right of direct appeal." 9 Under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(aXll), direct appeals may be taken
from "[alil judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not
limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or holding or
declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgments
or orders." uo This section has been interpreted "as permitting 'a direct
appeal of an order in a child custody case regarding which parent has
custody regardless of finality,' and thus such orders are not subject to
the interlocutory or discretionary appeal procedures."'
After a series of extensions since the Domestic Relations Pilot Project
was first initiated, Rule 34 of the Georgia Supreme Court was amended
to add subsection (4), the standard for granting applications to appeal
final divorce decrees.'
An application filed by an attorney seeking to
rely on the standard set forth in Rule 34(4) must be accompanied by a
certificate of good faith."2 If the court finds that an application is

114.
115.
116.

O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(e), -35(k).
O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-35(h), -35(k).
315 Ga. App. 711, 712-13, 728 S.E.2d 244, 245 (2012).

117. Id. at 711-12, 728 S.E.2d at 244-45.
118. Id. at 712, 728 S.E.2d at 245.
119. Id. at 713, 728 S.E.2d at 245.
120. O.C.G. § 5-6-34(aXll).
121. Brabant,315 Ga. App. at 712, 728 S.E.2d at 245 (citation omitted) (quoting Edge
v. Edge, 290 Ga. 551, 552, 722 S.E.2d 749, 751 (2012)).
122. GA. Sup. Cr. R. 34.
123. Id.
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frivolous and denies the application, the attorney who filed the
application may be assessed a penalty of up to $2,500.'"
IX. IMPERMISSIBLE MODIFICATION OF FINAL DECREE
In two cases reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court, Doane v.
LeCornu126 and Greenwood v. Greenwood," the trial courts were
found to have impermissibly modified the parties' final decrees of
divorce." 7 In Doane, the trial court found the husband in contempt for
failing to remove the wife's name from the mortgage on the lake house
and for failing to "buy out" his wife's interest in the lake house through
a series of payments, both of which were obligations required by the
parties' final decree."u
To purge his contempt, the husband was
ordered to sell the lake house that had been awarded to him by the final
decree and satisfy his financial obligations to his wife with the proceeds.12 9 This was error.8 0 The trial court was not allowed "to
compel a party who was awarded a specific asset to sell or otherwise
convert that asset in order to comply with some other provision of the
decree."' 3 ' To order the husband to sell the lake house and pay the
wife "from the proceeds 'amounted to a modification. '"" 2
In Greenwood, the husband was obligated to remove the wife's name
from the mortgage associated with the marital residence on or before
October 1, 2009, either through refinancing the debt or selling the
residence. If this obligation was not completed by October 1, 2009, the
husband was obligated to pay the wife a penalty of $10,000 on October
2, 2009.'
Following a hearing on the wife's motion for contempt, the
trial court converted the monetary penalty into a lien on the marital
residence and extended the time by which the husband was to have sold
the marital residence from a certain date to a "reasonable period of time"
due to "market conditions."3 4

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
289 Ga. 379, 711 S.E.2d 673 (2011).
289 Ga. 163, 709 S.E.2d 803 (2011).
Doane, 289 Ga. at 381, 711 S.E.2d at 675; Greenwood, 289 Ga. at 165, 709 S.E.2d

at 805.
128.
129.
130.
131.
S.E.2d
132.
133.

Doane, 289 Ga. at 379-80, 711 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 380, 711 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 380-81, 711 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 381, 711 S.E.2d at 675 (quoting Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570-71, 690
410, 414 (2010)).
Id. (quoting Darroch, 286 Ga. at 571, 690 S.E.2d at 415).
Greenwood, 289 Ga. at 163, 709 S.E.2d at 804.

134. Id. at 165, 709 S.E.2d at 806.
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The court held that "[tihe test to determine whether an order is
clarified or modified is whether the clarification is reasonable or whether
it is so contrary to the apparent intention of the original order as to
amount to a modification." 35 The trial court's conversion of the
monetary penalty into a lien to be paid some time in the future and the
extension of time by which the husband had to sell the marital residence
was so contrary to the intent of the original order as to amount to a
modification. 86
X. ATTORNEY FEES
In Abt v. Abt, 37 the trial court found that the wife improperly

expanded the litigation by causing the children to "vacillate in their
respective custodial elections," by exposing the children to a problematic
boyfriend, and by otherwise creating circumstances that led to the need
for procedural safeguards such as a guardian ad litem, a restraining
order, and emergency hearings.'38 The trial court's award
of fees to
40
139
the husband under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) was upheld.

135.
S.E.2d
136.
S.E.2d
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id, at 164-65, 709 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 297, 637
716, 718 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 165, 709 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 297, 637
716, 718 (2006)).
289 Ga. 166, 709 S.E.2d 806 (2011).
Id. at 167, 709 S.E.2d at 807.
O.C.G. § 9-15-14(b) (2006).
Ab, 289 Ga. at 167, 709 S.E.2d at 807-08.

